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Abstract: Regarding the discussion on a New Constitution in Chile, the debate on the 
autonomy of the Central Bank has polarized: Some consider it fundamental for 
macroeconomic balances, and others question it as an "authoritarian enclave". Should the 
Constitution settle this issue? It will be seen that it is not so much what it says on paper that 
matters, but how the autonomy and independence of the Central Bank are articulated in the 
reality. 
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Introduction 
Among the variety of issues raised by constituent candidates, political analysts, and 
other actors regarding the Constitutional Convention, one that has caused controversy is that 
of the autonomy and objectives of the Central Bank.  
Despite the importance and interest of the discussion in this area, the debate has tended 
to polarize: Some see in the Bank's constitutional autonomy the “Holy Grail” of solutions to 
macro problems, and those who see in it nothing more than an "authoritarian enclave". This 
controversy has been turning into a technical discussion on how to implement the eventual 
changes, which has simplified the real complexity hidden in this discussion, not considering 
imperative aspects to be considered, such as the important current context of political 
transformation and the economic and social effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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(Complutense of Madrid University, Spain), Bachelor of Laws (Finis Terrae University, Chile). Member of the 
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Should the Constitution regulate the Central Bank? Notes on its autonomy 
During the last decades, there has been a large amount of literature on the variable 
"independence" of central banks and its relationship with certain economic policy objectives 
such as inflation1. The most orthodox economic doctrine identifies a direct relationship 
between central bank independence and price stability (Alesina & Summers, 1993), which is 
why it has been suggested that there is no room for discussion on this point. However, in 
recent years, increasingly sophisticated econometric instruments and models have challenged 
the recognition of "independence" as an isolated variable that can be understood (and 
sustained) on its own (Campillo & Miron, 1997). 
The discussion on legal autonomy has had a similar evolution. It has been suggested in 
the literature that central bank autonomy has no small effect on a country's macroeconomy, 
especially in the control of inflation (García, 2019). However, legal-constitutional (including 
legal) autonomy does not necessarily mean effective or de facto autonomy, and here is the 
big caveat of the question. The effective autonomy of a central bank does not arise 
instantaneously from the simple recognition of its autonomy by a legal system but depends 
on multiple factors such as the political stability of a country, the financial market (Posen, 
1995) and even existing inequality (Dolmas et al., 2000). Hence, it is difficult to establish a 
clear correlation between independence (or autonomy in the Chilean case) and monetary and 
inflationary stability. In other words, de jure independence2 alone can hardly be an 
explanatory variable for good macroeconomic or monetary performance specifically. 
Economic intuition suggests that the more de jure independent central banks are, the 
lower inflation will be in countries, but in an empirical paper, Gutiérrez (2003), shows that 
there is not much support for this theory "when studying the relationship between de jure 
central bank independence and inflationary outcomes in developing countries". One of the 
possible reasons for this result could be the importance of variables such as the rule of law 
and adherence to regulations that do exist in developed countries, among others already 
mentioned. 
 
1 See, for example, Mankiw (2015) and Samuelson & Nordhaus (2009), general textbooks on Economics, as 
well as ones to be cited in this article. 




Figure I. Percentage of the annual CPI in Chile 
 
Prepared by the author with data from the World Bank (2021). 
Figure 1 shows how inflation in Chile began a strong downward trend in the 1990s and 
remained stable during the last decade. The most repeated explanations for this phenomenon 
are since the Central Bank's Organic Law3 had entered into force a year earlier, and although 
it is a variable to consider, it would be a mistake to give it explanatory power in isolation, 
since during that time there was also a strong political, institutional, and international 
economic relations transformation, which is also (as mentioned) significant. There may be a 
spurious correlation or even no significant correlation at all. 
As Rosende (1997) explains, the legal recognition of the Central Bank's independence 
is still important, since it allows the objectives of the Central Bank to have a longer-term 
vision (or State and not government commitments, recalling the classic problem in economics 
known as the time inconsistency of policy4). Successful comparative experiences give 
strength to this idea, as is the case of Switzerland, the United States, Germany today and 
before the transfer of the Bundesbank to the European Central Bank, and Italy and Spain after 
the creation and subjugation of this organization. 
However, this does not mean that everything can be discussed, especially given the 
interesting arguments that question the independence of central banks based on democratic 
 
3 Chilean Law No. 18,840. 
4 This problem is related to the fact that decisions that seem to be more efficient at a given moment may not be 
so in the future. Those in charge of economic policy may announce in advance the policy they will carry out, 
influencing the expectations of economic agents and their decision-making, and they may not keep their word. 
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control (which is a potential source of positive externalities). But for such a discussion it is 
important, once again, to differentiate between de jure and de facto independence or 
autonomy. Taking this distinction into account, it would not seem necessary to deprive the 
institution under consideration in this article of its legal autonomy; it would even suffice to 
rethink the debate and evaluate the need for the role of the central bank to be regulated at the 
constitutional level or simply at the legal level. Indeed, the current legislation (both 
constitutional and that found in Law No. 18,840) does not preclude the fact that there may 
be some sort of political control or influence over the Central Bank. Madariaga (2020) is 
right when he points out “that traditionally there has been a preference for advisors who lean 
towards a certain economic orthodoxy”; but it is no less true that nothing prevents a 
circumstantial majority from deciding to appoint heterodox economists. 
Going further, the powers of the Minister of Finance, recognized by the organic law, 
such as attending the meetings of the Central Bank Council with the right to speak, proposing 
the adoption of certain resolutions, and suspending the application of a resolution or 
resolution adopted at a meeting, should not be ignored5. All these powers leave room for a 
government of the day to be able to interfere in the central bank (although they may seem 
insufficient, this is not a bad thing). 
There have also been questions about the Central Bank's inflation-control objective. It 
has been argued that it responds to economic orthodoxy and that it is too conservative. Along 
these lines, it has been suggested that the Central Bank should consider objectives of 
protection and promotion of employment. Contrary to all this, in the first place, it is false that 
the Central Bank has only an inflation target (its duty is not only to watch over the stability 
of the currency, but also to watch over financial stability), and it is also false that it is 
conservative (just look at the inflation target of the European Central Bank, which is 2% per 
year6, as opposed to the Chilean Central Bank, which has a target of 3%7). 
Secondly, as de Gregorio (2006) argues, having an inflation target does not mean that 
the costs of unemployment are not considered, since it is not always intended to be achieved 
 
5 Law No. 18,840. Article 19. 
6 See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/tasks/monpol/html/index.en.html.  
7 See: https://www.bcentral.cl/web/banco-central/el-banco/gobierno-corporativo/funciones-del-banco.  
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as it is not indifferent to the economic cycle (a matter that depends on the economic 
policymakers). The author adds that "the advantage of specifying the objective of 
macroeconomic stability in terms of an inflation target avoids the disadvantages of defining 
two objectives that could be incoherent", especially since it is difficult to know the product 
of full employment, which could lead to a trend of acceleration or deceleration of inflation 
depending on the estimation of that product. All in all, what is striking for the public 
conversation and the work of the Convention would be to state positions on how this 
economic policy objective is pursued, whether by obeying fixed rules or discretionarily, or 
by adopting an active or passive role depending on the circumstances, specifically in times 
of economic crisis due to extraordinary events or to the economic cycle itself. 
The above requires attention in consideration of two issues: i) The presence in Chile of 
a radically more disaggregated political landscape than in the 90′ and early 2000′, and ii) The 
greater demands of public spending to face the crisis produced by Covid-19. The former for 
reasons already mentioned, such as problems of political stability and governance that 
constitute an explanatory variable of de facto autonomy, while the latter since public debt 
and deficits can encourage an aggressively expansive monetary policy, generating inflation. 
This is the result of the apparent lightness with which some countries take fiscal policy and 
the lack of awareness of its effects on the time horizon8, added to the public debt purchase 
programs that the main central banks have implemented because of the financial crisis. 
Thus, it is necessary to abandon the dogma of de jure independence of central banks as 
the solution to all macroeconomic problems (as this generates a vice that impoverishes the 
deliberative exercise). Efforts should be made to ensure that this independence is de facto, 
opening the possibility of studying other complementary mechanisms to guarantee it. In this 
sense, as mentioned above, it would be appropriate to discuss whether it is necessary to 
incorporate the Central Bank in the Constitution or whether it would be sufficient to give it 
a merely legal status since both ways could ensure effective independence. Examples of this 
case are the Federal Reserve of the United States, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the 
 
8 Such is the case of Argentina and European Union countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, France, and 
Italy, which have public debt close to or above 100% of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2019). 
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Bank of Canada, and the Bank of England, which, although they do not have constitutional 
autonomy, would be difficult to discuss their effective autonomy. 
It also seems advisable to consider positions concerning the design of the economic 
policy setting for which the agency is responsible. These designs could be based on fixed 
rules or discretionarily, and it would be desirable to find a meeting point (or moderation) 
because formal institutions coexist with situations that may become extraordinary, although 
they must enjoy stability in any case. From this point of view, it could be considered, among 
other things, that the Central Bank should make its inflation target more flexible, or that it 
should follow rules like those of the Bank of England, where the definition of the inflation 
target is determined by the government of the day, but it is the Bank which autonomously 
defines its monetary policy to achieve this goal9. However, they must be the essential 
elements that the Convention should contemplate to address this issue. 
Conclusions 
Economic policy is managed in an uncertain world, and discretion indeed gives 
flexibility to better respond to unforeseen events. But given the political business cycle and 
the economic challenges brought about by the Covid-19 crisis, limited discretion would be 
the perfect balance between a wide margin of action and a strong framework to avoid the 
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